Death of a Salesman’s Manager: Soft Information, Familiarity, and Misconduct in Financial Advisory Firms

Part of the Lubar Research Seminar Series

Speaker: Will Gerken, University of Kentucky

We investigate how increased information asymmetry between branch managers and financial advisors impacts advisor misconduct. Using branch manager deaths as exogenous shocks to the information environment, we employ difference-in-differences models with a matched advisor sample. We find a significant immediate decrease in advisor misconduct following a manager’s death, which fades over time. This effect is stronger among advisors with longer tenure overlap, shared ethnicity, and more complex business activities. Our findings suggest that the soft information accumulated by branch managers – which reduces information asymmetry – may facilitate misconduct, challenging the notion that reduced information asymmetry inherently deters unethical behavior. These findings highlight the complex dual role of branch managers in ensuring compliance while driving revenue generation within firms.