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If it came down to a choice between saving Hitler or Gandhi from a sinking ship, assistant professor of philosophy Stan Husi would let Gandhi in the lifeboat every time.<\/p>\n
And that, he argues, is one of the reasons why humanity does not have equal moral worth.<\/p>\n
Moral equality is a very abstract concept, but at its core is the notion that each person on Earth has equal intrinsic value and should therefore be given an equal voice and equal regard in society. Moral equality is a quality that theoretically stands apart from all of our other attributes \u2013 like integrity, intelligence, social status, etc.<\/p>\n
Husi\u2019s not convinced. He challenges the idea in a paper published in the Journal of Ethics entitled, \u201cWhy We (almost certainly) are Not Moral Equals.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u201cI\u2019m skeptical of equality,\u201d he said. \u201cI say in the paper that we all have witnessed horrible discrimination and racism, all of these things that went wrong in the past. We all agree that these are horrible things. And so we assert that everyone is morally equal. And I\u2019m like, really? Gandhi and Hitler are moral equals? The Dalai Lama and Stalin are moral equals? How can this be?\u201d<\/p>\n
The main arguments against moral equality<\/strong><\/p>\n In his paper, Husi identifies four obstacles to the notion of moral equality.<\/p>\n No. 1<\/strong>: \u201cMoral status would have to be connected to something in us that is For example, one could make the argument that everyone who is taller than 1 inch would have moral equality. After all, all humans are taller than 1 inch and supposedly have equal moral worth. But, he points out, such a measure isn\u2019t significant (and is, in fact, downright silly).<\/p>\n No. 2<\/strong>: Whatever quality determines equal moral worth \u201chas to equalize. Everybody has to have it in the same amount,\u201d Husi said. \u201cMany philosophers think that 1 and 2 are sufficient for moral equality. In the paper, I\u2019m saying that seems to be curiously mistaken.\u201d<\/p>\n No. 3<\/strong>: Even if we were able to identify whatever quality about humanity makes us moral equals, we would have to prove that there isn\u2019t another similar quality that is also morally significant and present in unequal amounts.<\/p>\n For instance, suppose rationality was the quality the determined peoples\u2019 equal moral standing, and everyone had it in equal amounts. Intelligence is a similar quality, but this feature may be present in people in different amounts. If rationality is so important to moral equality, why wouldn\u2019t our intelligence also impact our moral worth?<\/p>\n No. 4<\/strong>: Husi\u2019s final argument is the \u201cthreshold\u201d premise \u2013 the idea that people are moral equals if they possess an amount above a certain threshold of whatever virtue determines equality.<\/p>\n The problem there, he argues, is that you must prove that there isn\u2019t another, equally significant threshold.<\/p>\n \u201cSuppose it\u2019s rationality in excess of some amount \u2018x\u2019 that matters,\u201d Husi said. \u201cNow you must make the further claim that rationality in excess of \u2018y\u2019 makes no difference.\u201d<\/p>\n Husi can\u2019t see how philosophers can reconcile any of those four issues.<\/p>\n The implications of no moral equality<\/strong><\/p>\n Though Husi thinks humans are not moral equals, he\u2019s quick to stress that this is not a justification to discriminate against people or hold on to prejudices. In fact, in some cases, it\u2019s an argument for the exact opposite.<\/p>\n \u201cWhite supremacists say white people are superior,\u201d Husi pointed out as an example. \u201cBoth the egalitarians and I say that\u2019s nonsense. My egalitarian friends say it\u2019s because we\u2019re moral equals, and I say it\u2019s because race has nothing to do whatever might matter (for determining moral equality). \u2026 It would violate the first condition that I posited in the paper.\u201d<\/p>\n Which is not to say that we shouldn\u2019t discriminate in select instances. Picking Gandhi over Hitler to share his lifeboat is discrimination, but morally necessary, Husi argued. If people were truly moral equals, picking between the two should be an impossible choice.<\/p>\n Husi was inspired to write his paper after reading a paper by his mentor, George Sher of Rice University, that argued for the existence of moral equality. The two had lively debates about the subject, and Husi eventually penned a rebuttal.<\/p>\n \u201cI have a lot of mistrust in slogans and assertions that sound nice,\u201d Husi said. \u201cI\u2019m just asking some deep philosophical questions about things that some people believe are true and trying to see whether they can be justified.\u201d<\/p>\n By Sarah Vickery, College of Letters & Science<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" If it came down to a choice between saving Hitler or Gandhi from a sinking ship, assistant professor of philosophy Stan Husi would let Gandhi in the lifeboat every time. And that, he argues, is one of the reasons why humanity does not have equal moral worth.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1234,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","uwm_wg_additional_authors":[]},"categories":[6],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-291","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"yoast_head":"\n
\nsignificant,\u201d Husi said.<\/p>\n