The Center for International Education is pleased to introduce its 2016/2017 Global Studies Research Fellows: Professors Jennifer Kibicho (College of Nursing), Anna Mansson McGinty (Geography and Women’s and Gender Studies), Blain Neufeld (Philosophy), Tasha Oren (English and Media Studies), and Chia Youyee Vang (History). The research collected in this volume of Intersections is made possible by the work of our Fellows addressing this year’s theme: diversities. Diversity is not merely an ideal that we’ve somehow come to adopt; it is a permanent feature of the global age. It characterizes most contemporary human experience and society, with profound social, cultural, political, economic, linguistic, legal, commercial, and artistic
implications. Our diverse world finds itself disrupted by violence, yet violence inherent in dreams of purity ends up only accelerating the dispersion of lives, perspectives, experiences, and representations. Diversities may be understood in the word’s most interdisciplinary sense: alternative forms of social integration conducive to diverse lives; diverse identity formations and struggles for autonomy; emergent demographic and social patterns around the world; the dynamic interplay of multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socially, economically and legally differentiated immigrants; emergent forms of non-exclusive citizenships; exiled and displaced lives; accelerated human movement, from refugees, professionals, farm workers, and asylum seekers to diasporas of various kinds; nativism and its consequences; and the paradoxical use of the universal language of human rights to fight for particular diversities.

A. Aneesh – Associate Professor of Sociology and Global Studies, Senior Director, International Affairs and Outreach, Center for International Education, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
When Reese Schonfeld, founder of The Food Network, defended the concept of his nascent cable network to a skeptical reporter in 1993, he observed that “there’s almost nothing you can do on television that you can’t do with a food angle.” Only two decades later, it was hard to imagine that a glut of food-themed programs, competitions, documentaries and profiles, or a cable network (or two) entirely devoted to food and its preparation ever raised an eyebrow as a less-than-obvious idea. In our current media environment, viewers who like to cook or eat—or just like watching others cook, eat, or talk about either—can binge-watch food programming uninterrupted, around the clock and across the globe. In the U.S. in particular, food television’s current popularity fits neatly into a relatively recent food-centric mainstream where celebrity chefs, upscale food trucks, eco-gastronoms, neo-Victorian mixologists, post-hipster artisan butchers, raw vegans, Paleo enthusiasts, and a booming social media ecosystem teeming with recipe bloggers, obsessive plate and menu documenters, and amateur food critics all make up parts of a vast gastro-industrial complex. Food culture is popular culture. This
moment is a product of a long and complex cultural history—with television at its center.

How narrative conventions and fixed program structures evolve on television has been an ongoing interest for me. Food preparation, fittingly, with its careful procedural logic, recipe components, assembly of ingredients within categories and repetition, provides an ideal subject with which to engage with televisuality, itself a complex process of variation within convention. Beyond structure, food and television also share deeply codified practices that can both maintain and shift cultural norms through signification, and both often appeal to identity, community and mutual tastes. But television doesn’t just share the same animating logic of recipes, genre, surprise, and predictability; cooking was crucial for first establishing television as a domestic, commercially-minded, medium but also, and repeatedly, took part in the reinvention of television in decades to come.

My project—part of a book manuscript—emerged from my long-term focus on television history and globalization, including past work on television formats and “competition” shows like *Top Chef*, and two pieces which, at the time that I wrote them, seemed like “one off” indulgences: an article on the rise of *Food Network* and its studied appeal to men and non-cooks, and a more recent essay on Asian American chef and restaurant culture.

My current work traces how culinary culture became pop
culture by focusing on the role of television as a dominant force in the cultural life of food. My method is to train the specific lens of cooking and food culture on television to illustrate how the latter operates as a national and global cultural agent, as well as an industry, a technology, and a narrative engine. My focus is on notions of change and diversity: in cooking genres, in representations of cooks and cuisines, and in the multiplying platforms of television itself.

Throughout its existence, television served as an arena where all matters edible link up with major preoccupations over difference: domesticity and public space, gender, race, class, locality, immigration, labor, identity and capital. This year, as a Global Studies Fellow at the UWM Center for International Education, I’m homing in on food television’s interaction with immigration, globalization and format diversities.

In tracing historical and contemporary food television, I look to highlight the conditions for the emergence of particular formats, industrial developments, and cultural trends—pointing to how food culture and media culture interact, and in the process, shape one another. In this sense, my project offers a unique model and lines of argumentation that differ from other academic work on food programming, studies of celebrity chefs, or scholarly works on cooking traditions and representation. While these are valuable, my work seeks to link food culture and globalization to media history and ethnic studies as a kind reciprocal history: an account of the
evolution of diverse food cultures and cooking on TV and the evolution of TV (from a box in the living room to a ubiquitous, on-demand and multi-platform entity) through its engagement with food as difference/identity.

As one prominent case study, I examine the few examples of Asian American culinary TV hosts, from the ground breaking Joyce Chen and Martin Yan (star of Yan Can Cook) who first introduced regional Chinese cooking to US television audiences through a radical evolving instructional format, to Ming Tsai, David Chang and Edward Lee, whose TV personas—within particular program styles and aesthetics—increasingly stressed a generational re-consideration of ethnic histories, innovation and reinvention.

Certainly, this history can be told as the evolution of minor-
ity chefs on television, paralleling other ethnic representational histories in other television genres. However, the history of Asian American chefs in TV is fraught, complicated by a particularly difficult relationship with food preparation and its place for Asian Americans in cultural memory. Conversely, the history of Asian food’s slow and steady integration into the American kitchen through television (distinct from the space of the “Asian” restaurant, or the American-made story of Chop Suey) is an important chapter in the history of Asian American culture and the global culinary mainstream. Here ethnicity, and a particular immigration history, meld with televisual generic conventions to confer a specific legibility onto the chef, ingredients, and the act of cooking.

When bringing the cultural life of food together with the symbolic, economic, and institutional aspects of television, food emerges as a surprisingly vital player in the creative and formal evolution of television itself. It is also a fitting vantage-point from which to observe how television conventions are formed with (and against) ideological, commercial and political pressures. As this approach illustrates, television’s long standing embrace of cooking shaped an evolving and complex cultural narrative that cast cooking and eating as profound yet unstable acts of signification, distinction, and identity performance. Thus, cooking on television is a crucial arena where not only gender and class but race, ethnicity, national identity, taste, and their cultural meanings were examined and
continuously reshaped since the medium’s beginning.

For example, the instructional cooking programs that became standard fare on local stations by the early 50s worked not only to produce viewers as competent cooks and family caretakers, but also to train female consumers in brand-specific shopping of appliances, food products, utilities, and—increasingly, as the 50s went on—in the use of packaged and processed foods. As many scholars noted, these programs offered a particularly rigid and ideologically-loaded view of food, the kitchen and the woman in it, seeking to “professionalize” the homemaker and produce the kitchen as the heart of the modern home—and the icon of American prosperity. Most of these live programs were hosted by older white female home economists and cooks that offered prescriptive instruction delivered with a direct address and a pragmatic approach. One typical example is *What’s New in the Kitchen with Breta Griem* which aired on Milwaukee’s-own WTMJ.

Yet, taken together, the landscape of TV cooking shows in the 50s was hardly uniform; as a formal staple of television from its very inception, cooking already presented itself as a rich area for different approaches, tones, personalities and genres. Early local programs offered more than just the staid and stern aproned-white-ladies. Here in Wisconsin, African American Chef Carson Gulley and his wife Beatrice hosted *What’s Cooking* for nearly a decade, starting in 1953 in Madison.
In Los Angeles, Italian Chef Milani and his energetic family entertained viewers with celebrity guests and sitcom-like comedic antics. In Chicago, poetry-reciting Eddie Doucette hosted a cooking show with a live band. In San Francisco, restauranteur Elena Zelayeta, cooked Mexican and Spanish food, and carried on a lively banter with her son and audience, while blind(!). Philadelphia’s Ernie Kovacs brought surrealist mayhem to his cooking program *Deadline for Dinner*—which he called “Dead Lion for Dinner”.

These, and many other examples, are important reminders that cooking-as-entertainment, escape, or personality-driven spectacle are hardly new to food programming. By 1966, when restaurateur and cookbook author Joyce Chen became the first person of color to host a national cooking show (and the second—after Julia Child—to champion a foreign nation-
al cuisine), food television had long shed its pragmatic, duty-bound tone in favor of self-styling: cooking as self-expression, cultural exploration, and a mark of personal sophistication.

In addition to the “instructional” and its stylistic development as an early cooking supergenre, I pay close attention to how notions of foreignness and difference are worked through in other cooking-themed programs like travelogues, the globally formatted cooking competition, and the currently popular chef-biographies. In parallel to the evolving conventions of food media, these programs help trace shifting understandings of the global imaginary, national, regional and local identities, and changing cultural investments in authenticity, tradition and reinvention.

In the last section of the project, I turn to new incarnations of food programming as food television conventions bleed across media to a diverse set platforms like on-demand streaming video and web content. Examples such as Netflix’ series A Chef’s Table (2014-), or the Kickstarter-funded web-original Eat Our Feelings (2015) reveal the process by which a globalizing food culture, a newly-mainstreamed food politics, and television in the age of converging and migrating media, replenish and renew themselves. Through this continuous process, food media combine, rework and transform socio-political anxieties, points of tension (and crisis) in health science discourses, and a roiling, dynamic cultural imaginary into coherent, meaning-making morsels.
As elsewhere in this project, this last section also reverses focus by suggesting how food (and food media) functions as a means to understanding contemporary television more generally: an enduring set of conventions, traditions, aesthetics and values which far exceed the box in the living room—or kitchen.

Notes


Images


My book project critiques the geographies of refuge to demonstrate the reification of refugees’ sense of place and belonging. The numbers of refugees from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia risking their lives in search of safe havens in the global north have forced world leaders to reconsider how refugees are viewed and managed. In recent years, discussions about the world refugee crisis have been highly charged, in particular debates regarding security concerns. Consequently, such categories as deserving and undeserving refugees have become ubiquitous in refugee discourse at the global and local level. The Fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975 set in motion the Indochinese refugee crisis, and the socialist regime takeover of Laos two weeks later pushed out thousands who had collaborated with the United States during the American war in Vietnam. Others from Cambodia fled Khmer Rouge repression. This study explores a little-known Hmong refugee experiment by French missionaries and government officials in the late 1970s. The intentional
community they built in the French Guiana jungle and its unusual success beg us to rethink the international humanitarian apparatus. From 507 in 1977, the Hmong Guianese population has increased to 3000 in 2015. While they represent only slightly more than one percent of the French Guiana population, they provide an estimated 70-90 percent of fresh produce and fruits sold in the department.

The demographic background of refugees from the former French colonies ranged from “generals and ministers to farmers and fishermen, highland tribespeople to the urban elite, students and housewives, warriors and draft dodgers, elderly grandparents and small children, extended families and unaccompanied minors.” The majority of Hmong fleeing Laos were farmers and their families, but many had served in the clandestine army that the U.S. established in support of its larger war efforts in Vietnam. Some perished as they trekked through the Lao jungles where paths often had to be cleared as they passed through areas with compact trees and thorn bushes. If the footpaths were near villages, the escapees would stay put during the day and travel by night. The thick jungles meant that sometimes the days were almost as dark as the nights. The escape by foot could take a couple of weeks to a month depending on the time of the year. When they reach the Lao-Thai border, the sigh of relief was often accompanied with fear as they prepared to cross the infamous Mekong River that claimed innumerable lives. Once they reached the Thai side and were registered in United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
sponsored camps, the refugees had to once again make decisions about an uncertain future. As they interacted with field workers in the first asylum camps, they learned of their options, which depended largely on the particular interests of host countries willing to accept them.

In the midst of this chaos, Father Yves Bertrais (Txiv Plig Nyiaj Pov) suggested that some of the 10,000 Hmong refugees interested in going to France be sent to French Guiana, which is located on the northeast side of South America. Father Bertrais had worked with Hmong in Laos since he arrived there in 1948. In collaboration with Hmong advisors and American missionaries William A. Smalley and G. Linwood Barney, he had helped to develop a written Hmong language using the Romanized Popular Alphabet in 1953. French presence in Guiana began in the mid-1700s, but officials had struggled to develop their South American possession. Originally inhabited by Native Americans, its multi-ethnic population resulted from French introduction of African slaves and Asian laborers. Between 1852 and 1946, it had been used as a penal colony. It became one of France’s overseas departments (département d’outre-mer) in 1946, but its 32,000-square mile territory remained underdeveloped and underpopulated. By the mid-1960s, its population was only 44,000, consisting of Asians, whites, Creoles, and Amerindians. It had a feeble agriculture, unorganized commerce, and lacked a railway. Despite this difficult condition, French officials concluded that development was possible through the exploitation of its forests,
mineral resources, and fishing. They proposed a number of ways to develop French Guiana, including the establishment of the Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (National Center for Space Studies) and the implantation of immigrants. In the early 1970s, officials’ concerns about French Guiana’s under-population, economic isolation, and continued dependence on Paris increased. Consequently, the argument for greater efforts to develop the department was supported by political leaders.

As the refugee situation intensified in mid- to late-1975, pressure was placed on the international community to respond. However, since France had been against U.S. military intervention in Vietnam, many French officials considered the crisis a problem that the U.S. should resolve. In fact, civilian and military officials at the highest level considered Hmong refugees “peuplades... inassimilables en France.” To be considered for resettlement in France, refugees had to have served in the French army during the colonial era, earned a French diploma, or possess French language skills. It was within this context that missionaries proposed sending Hmong refugees to French Guiana. The uninhabited jungles and warm climate were similar to Laos. Having lived with Hmong, missionaries had witnessed their hard work ethic and concluded that Hmong could thrive there. The idea was supported by officials like Pierre Dupont-Gonin, who had served as advisor to the Government of Laos from 1954 to 1960. In 1957, he participated in the creation of the Vientiane School of Law and he was involved in the 1961
fourteen nation conference in Geneva to examine Laos’ political status. Following the conference, he went on to serve as inspector of customs in French Guiana from 1962 to 1967, and then returned to Laos as economic minister from 1971 to 1973. As a result of his posts in Laos, Dupont-Gonin was familiar with the Hmong. Additionally, young Hmong who had received formal education who were living in France at the time lobbied officials to allow Hmong to settle in French Guiana. The refugees would serve two purposes: contributing to the department’s population growth and developing agriculture. Despite the initial resistance, the proposal prevailed with the support of a number of key individuals, including Dr. Claude Ho-a-Chuck, then Commune of Roura Mayor and President of the General Counsel of French Guiana, as well as officials like Olivier Stirn, then Secretary of State for Overseas Departments and Territories (Secrétaire d’État aux départements et territoires d’outre-mer, DOM-TOM). Stirn backed the proposal because it fulfilled part of Le Plan Vert (the Green Plan) devised to develop overseas territories. Following a site visit in April 1976, it was decided that 500 refugees would be accepted. Dupont-Gonin argued that the eventual support of Hmong to rebuild their lives in French Guiana “se fondait essentiellement sur leur caractère industrieux, leur curiosité et la vivacité de leur intelligence...” (“was essentially based on their industrious character, their curiosity, and the vivacity of their intelligence”) (1996, 71). President of the French Republic, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and his Prime Minister, Raymond Barre, provided funding to carry out the
operation while Catholic Relief provided funding for transportation from Bangkok to Cayenne. The French embassy in Bangkok selected the families that would go directly to Guiana. Father René Charrier traveled to French Guiana three months prior to prepare for the arrival of the refugees. Careful planning was done to ensure that the Hmong would be able to exist as a homogenous group. Since intra-clan unions were prohibited, refugees selected had to represent the different clans to enable inter-clan marriages. Close attention was also paid to religious diversity. Those selected consisted of Catholics, Protestants, and ancestor worshippers. Refugees were told to prepare seeds that they could plant in their new home.

The operation did, however, suffer setbacks. Some Guianese welcomed the refugees while others regarded this installation of an Asian group as “la menace d’un péril jaune” (“the yellow peril menace”). The latter consisted of elements that interpreted the operation as the French government’s attempt to settle “…une population étrangère docile, susceptible de perpétuer la présence française en Guyane” (“a docile foreign population that is susceptible to perpetuate French presence in Guiana”). The various trade unions spoke out against the refugees and “les murs de la ville sont remplis d’inscriptions anti-Hmong” (“the walls of the city were filled with anti-Hmong inscriptions”). To minimize the level of overt protests when the refugees arrived, government officials planned for the Hmong to arrive in the evening and worked with local military and
police forces to transport them to the jungle. Nhia Lue Vang
(Nyiaj Lwm Vaj), who was one of the 45 people on the first
flight, explained that from Ban Vinai refugee camp, the
group boarded a flight in Bangkok on September 2, 1977.
They had a one-hour layover in New Delhi, India, and a one-
hour layover in Teheran, Iran before landing at Orly Airport
in Paris. Then, they were transported by bus to Charles de
Gaulle airport where they would be on their way to French
Guiana. They stopped for an hour in Martinique and another
hour in Guadeloupe before reaching Cayenne. He described
the first week as follows:

Men building Cacao village, 1977
When we landed in Cayenne on September 3, 1977, it was a little after 7:00pm. It was already dark by then, but we could see lights all around us. They sent soldiers and the police to pick us up from the airport... On September 4, 1977, everyone woke up and saw only thick jungle. We heard birds chirping and animals making weird noises. It was so strange we had no idea what kind of birds they were... We began clearing the forest on September 15... We cleared half of the field and the bulldozer cleared the rest. When we finished, we divided it according to family size.”

Father René Charrier (Txiv Plig Neej Vaj) had participated in
the earlier site visit so he traveled to French Guiana to await the group’s arrival while another priest, Father Jacques Brix, met the group in Paris and accompanied them to Cayenne. In the course of several weeks, the French government had completed its mission of installing 507 people from 108 families in Cacao, which is 45 miles south of Cayenne. The site was chosen because it was far enough away from the capital yet not so far that supplies could not be easily sent to them. Former refugee narratives suggest that they believed those in power wanted them to be out of sight from the local population. While the distance was also to prevent the refugees from being tempted to go to the city, it inadvertently facilitated a certain privacy. Each refugee was allocated 40 francs per day and they were expected to become self-sufficient. Farming became the backbone of Hmong society in French Guiana. Once this group proved that they could survive, one more group consisting of 560 people was brought directly from Thailand. They arrived on November 14, 1979. A new village, Javouhey (Commune de Mana), was established 180 miles to the north of Cacao. Natural population increase and the migration of “les Hmong de Métropole” led to the establishment of the Roucoucoua village (Commune d’Iracoubo) in 1989 and Corosonny village (Commune de Régina) in 1992. Some families have extended their farm operations beyond these villages, such as Counamama village (Commune d’Iracoubo), and Matiti and Carapa villages (Commune de Nacouria), where they live farther away from other Hmong.
What has become of the refugees in French Guiana? In what ways have the intentional communities initially established by French missionaries and government officials been sustained? What changes have occurred to challenge the desire of those in power to conceal the refugees from French Guiana society? How did residents in French Guiana respond to the Hmong when they were eventually “discovered” and how have they been regarded over time? During the months following their arrival, they remained isolated. They focused on building the utopic society that government officials and missionaries envisioned for them. Narratives from former refugees revealed that their exposure to the larger French Guiana society occurred gradually. As elder Txoov Yeeb Yaj described it, “Hmong did not have vehicles so we just stayed in the village. People didn’t really know we were here because they did not see many of us at once. We slowly emerged as we began to bring our vegetables to the Cayenne market.”16 My research on refugee experiences in North America during the last two decades has revealed that Hmong forced migration to the Western Hemisphere has been met with mixed reactions. They have struggled to make sense of their lives in the places that they now call home.

Having visited many places in the U.S., Canada, and mainland France, and more recently, French Guiana, it is clear that the French Guiana experiment is unique both in terms of process and outcome. In the next phase of my research, I will attempt to answer the above questions based on the eth-
(Above) Farmer selling produce in Cayenne. (Below) Farewell sign in Javouhey; artwork represents Hmong clothing designs.
nographic interviews conducted during my research trip to French Guiana in May 2015 along with archival research that I have conducted over the past year and a half. The resulting monograph will explore the many dimensions of their lived experiences from the perspectives of former refugees and their children. Some themes that have emerged from my data analysis include the following:

• Hmong Guianese are proud of their reputation as being responsible for “feeding French Guiana” with fruits and vegetables that did not exist before they arrived.

• As a result of the isolation, Hmong language maintenance is strong.

• Despite their isolation, Hmong families have acquired French practices, such as eating breakfast “like the French” (bread, coffee, tea) instead of rice, meat, and greens.

• Despite some of the challenges they face, many regard French Guiana as “Moob Lub Ntuj Ceeb Tsheej” (Hmong’s heaven). They consider the villages they constructed as the places where Hmong are free to be Hmong.

• Interethnic tensions have come about as a result of Hmong success in farming. Hmong often hire day laborers who are either from local indigenous groups or migrant workers from Suriname, Brazil, and Haiti. While they need help, some fear these populations as a result of frequent robberies by mi-
grant workers pretending to be looking for work.

• Few young Hmong desire to continue this way of life, but professional job opportunities are infrequent. Additionally, arable land is becoming scarce as national and international efforts to promote sustainable agriculture conflict with Hmong farming practices. That is, in the past land was given to prospective farmers without much difficulty and no soil tests were conducted. Today, soil tests are required. If land on which a farmer desires to plant certain fruits and vegetables is not deemed suitable, then new land has to be identified. Hmong villagers interpret this as an obstacle to their success.

• Because of the low quality of public education in the villages, Hmong families send their teenage sons and daughters to larger provincial schools or those located in the capital. Families who have the means send their children to France to attend high school and pursue post-baccalaureate education. Once exposed to life in larger towns in French Guiana or France, some refuse to return.

• While they are economically well-off, Hmong Guianese have had little political power due to their isolation from the larger society. Efforts to gain economic and political power is slowly taking place with the appointment of Albert Siong (Nyiaj Laug Xyooj) as president of the Guiana Agriculture Chamber (President de chambre d'agriculture Guyane).
•In the early days, the refugees helped one another, but farmers have become increasingly competitive with one another. This is exacerbated by some tensions that exist between those who moved from France and those who came straight from the refugee camp. The former tends to regard the latter as less “modern” since they have not been exposed to mainland French life. A growing number of Hmong entrepreneurs who settled throughout France and received formal education are moving to French Guiana, changing the scope of Hmong farming.

•Hmong farmers cannot export what they produce and are limited to local markets. It is becoming harder to sell fruits and vegetables at the existing markets. Because there is a fixed number of stalls, those without a permanent spot have to wait until the owners are finished selling and space becomes available. With insufficient time to sell and a lack of adequate refrigeration, fruits and produce have to be thrown away, thus reducing profits.

Notes

Vietnam. About half a million have returned home but most have sought refuge in third countries: 1.4 million in the U.S.; 260,000 in China; 200,000 in Canada; 185,000 in Australia, and 130,000 in France.


6. Ibid., pp. 66, 70, and 80.

7. Pierre Dupont-Gonin. 1996. *L'opération Hmong en Guyane française de 1977: les tribulations d'une ethnie : Un nouvel exode d'Extrême-Orient en Extrême-Occident*. Metz: Association Péninsule. Dr. Claude Ho-a-Chuck is of Asian origin. While conducting research in Cacao in May 2015, I was invited to participate in a birthday celebration that residents of Cacao held for him. It was the first time that the
village had held an event of this nature to thank him and his wife, Simone Ho-a-Chuck, for letting the Hmong refugees settle in French Guiana. Both Mr. and Mrs. Ho-a-Chuck dressed in traditional Hmong clothes and spoke in-depth about why they supported bringing Hmong to French Guiana and what they did in the early years to help the refugees.


11. Ibid.


13. Priests who worked with Hmong spoke the language and gave themselves Hmong names. Father Brix had been placed in Laos so he spoke Lao, but not Hmong. Thus, he did not have a Hmong name like Father Bertrais and Father Charrier.


Images


HIV/AIDS is the leading cause of death in sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{1} According to UNAIDS (2016), 78 million people have been infected with HIV since the start of the epidemic, of whom 35 million have died from AIDS-related causes. \textsuperscript{13} percent of the world’s population live in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and yet the sub-continent bears a disproportionately high burden of HIV (70\% of the population currently living with HIV), and is considered the epicenter of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.\textsuperscript{2} \textsuperscript{37} of the 47 countries worldwide with a generalized HIV epidemic (\textgreater{}1\% HIV prevalence rates) are located in Africa, and nine SSA countries have HIV prevalence rates that exceed 10\%. \textsuperscript{11} countries, all in SSA, had over 1 million persons living with HIV in 2014.\textsuperscript{3} In Africa, HIV is a predominantly transmitted through heterosexual sex.\textsuperscript{4,5}

The HIV/AIDS epidemic in SSA has been characterized as
“feminized” because it disproportionately affects adolescent girls and women 15-49 years. In most African countries, the majority of people infected with HIV are women, and, in some cases, women are more than twice as likely as men to be infected with the virus.\textsuperscript{1,6,7} In higher HIV prevalence regions, women accounted for 56\% of new HIV infections among adults.\textsuperscript{8} Adolescent girls and young women aged 15–24 years are at particularly high risk of HIV infection, accounting for 20\% of new HIV infections among adults globally in 2015—despite making up only 11\% of the adult population\textsuperscript{8}—and 25\% of new HIV infections among adults in SSA.\textsuperscript{8} Both macro and micro studies on the association between poverty and HIV have been mixed.\textsuperscript{9–11}

The feminization of the HIV/AIDS epidemic—the disproportionately high HIV incidence in young women compared to young men—has been explained by the transactional sexual relationships in the context of gendered social and economic inequities.\textsuperscript{6,12,13} Transactional sex has been defined as non-marital, noncommercial sexual relationships motivated by the implicit assumption that sex will be exchanged for material benefit or status.\textsuperscript{6,12} Even though most of the transactional sex literature is concentrated in SSA, transactional sex practices are prevalent in all regions of the world.\textsuperscript{13–16} Epidemiological studies have demonstrated a significant association between transactional sex and HIV prevalence.\textsuperscript{6,17} A meta-analysis of studies focused on SSA found that women who practice transactional sex are between 1.5 and nearly 2 times more likely to be infected with
Women may engage in transactional sex to meet a continuum of needs and wants that range from basic survival to satisfying and gaining access to material possessions in “pursuit of modernity.” Transactional sexual relationships are thought to increase HIV risk because they are often associated with multiple partnerships, or intergenerational relationships between older wealthier sexually experienced men who are more likely to be infected with and transmit HIV to younger women. These sexual network patterns spread HIV in two interconnected ways: they facilitate sexual contact with others soon after an individual has contracted the virus—when their viral load is high and the virus is at its most infective state. Second, transactional partnerships are usually associated with lower condom use, and there is evidence to suggest that the greater value of transfers, the greater likelihood of unprotected sex. When transactional sex takes the form of multiple and overlapping partnerships that are concurrent in time, the risk of spreading HIV increases substantially. At the individual and interpersonal level, transactional sex has been associated with a number of HIV risk behaviors including alcohol use, history of intimate partner violence, multiple and concurrent partnerships, intergenerational sex, and inconsistent condom use.

The purpose of these brief literature review is to examine the empirical evidence for correlates of HIV transmission risk
and economic-related factors that account for the disproportionate prevalence of HIV in SSA.

**Is HIV a disease of poverty?**

Because the largest global burden of HIV/AIDS is in SSA, many postulate that poverty and HIV/AIDS are interlinked, and that poverty is a primary driver of the epidemic.\textsuperscript{1,4,22} HIV/AIDS has been described as a disease of poverty suggesting it primarily affects the poor.\textsuperscript{9} Studies that link poverty to HIV transmission risk identify several possible pathways that increase vulnerability and susceptibility to HIV: the poor are less likely to internalize prevention messages because of low levels of education and limited HIV-related knowledge, and less likely to be nourished and healthy because of inadequate sanitation and limited access to health care services, and more likely to engage in risky practices including earlier sexual debut, intergenerational and/or transactional sex, and having unprotected sex because they cannot afford condoms.\textsuperscript{4,22} Moreover, the HIV-positive poor with limited access to life-prolonging antiretroviral therapy (ART) are more likely to transmit HIV to others.\textsuperscript{23}

Bloom and his colleagues found a positive association between HIV prevalence and four measures of poverty—per-capita GDP, income inequality (measured by Gini coefficient), absolute poverty (the population share living on less than US$1 a day) and the human poverty index
(weighted measure of life expectancy, literacy, access to water, sanitation and health services, and malnutrition)—for all continents with the exception of Africa.\textsuperscript{9,24} Weizer et al (2007) reported a positive association between absolute poverty (food insufficiency) and HIV risk taking behaviors in Swaziland and Botswana, with the likelihood of engaging in risky behaviors ranging from 50\% higher odds of inter-generational sex, to 80\% higher odds of selling sex for money or resources.\textsuperscript{9,25} Nii-Amoo and colleagues found that across urban and rural settings, poverty as measured by wealth index was positively associated with early sexual debut and multiple sexual partnerships.\textsuperscript{5} A Malawian study reported that women were sometimes forced into multiple transactional sexual relationships in order to feed their families.\textsuperscript{4,26} Lastly, a South Africa study noted that low socioeconomic status was associated with increased odds of having multiple sexual partnerships, transactional sex, and coerced sex.\textsuperscript{18,27,28}

Critique: Broad macro-level measures such as the Gini coefficient and per-capita GDP fail to capture the depth of poverty—the fact that poor people are not poor in the same way and do not have the similar living conditions, income or skill levels.\textsuperscript{9} Macro-level studies that simply correlate poverty rates with HIV erroneously assume constant and context-independent direction of causal effect.\textsuperscript{9} Poverty per se does not have a specific sexual practice outcome, and can lead to increased risk-taking through larger sexual networks or reduced risk-taking due to isolation and smaller sexual
networks.\textsuperscript{9} It’s important to note that the relationship between poverty and HIV/AIDS prevalence could be a reflection of both an upstream effect of poverty on the risk of HIV infection and a downstream effect on the adverse impact of AIDS illness on household poverty.\textsuperscript{22}

**Beyond poverty: structural-level drivers of poverty and HIV**

Several studies conducted in SSA have highlighted economic insecurity and vulnerability-related ‘push factors’ for high risk sexual activities among women: frequent droughts and limited wage opportunities in Southern Province of Zambia,\textsuperscript{18} landlessness and drought in Malawi,\textsuperscript{26} and food insufficiency in Botswana and Swaziland.\textsuperscript{25} In Malawi, certain social groups were found to engage in fatalistic high-risk behaviors despite knowledge of the risks, to affirm their social identity and to deny that “anything they do makes a difference to what they perceive as a life of powerlessness and despair.”\textsuperscript{29} Women on the margin of destitution with restricted access to productive resources (e.g., land and credit) may have lower future expectations for survival, and therefore engage in high risk transactional sex out of economic necessity to support themselves and their children.\textsuperscript{18,23,30,31}

Economic vulnerability (high dependence on rain-fed subsistence farming, livelihood collapse due to floods, droughts, seasonality of income)\textsuperscript{5,18,23,32,33} significantly
impact food security, while experiences of economic shock (e.g., a death, illness or job loss) can exacerbate women’s sexual vulnerability, and has been associated with high risk activities including early onset of sexual activity through incentivizing transactional sex, extramarital sex, and multiple sexual partnerships.\textsuperscript{5,18,34} Food insecurity—thought to increase sexual risk taking among women who may engage in transactional sex to procure food for themselves and their children\textsuperscript{18}—has been associated with inter-generational sexual relationships, inconsistent condom use with a non-primary partner, and a lack of control in sexual relationships.\textsuperscript{4} Poor men who cannot afford to support a family because of limited income earning opportunities may live in involuntary celibacy, unable to marry and driven to engage in casual high risk sex.\textsuperscript{4}

**Is HIV a disease of the affluent?**

Poverty as a driver of HIV/AIDS remains a contested hypothesis due to empirical evidence of higher HIV prevalence rates in wealthier countries and among wealthier groups across Africa.\textsuperscript{7,18,22,35} Moreover, the relationship between HIV and wealth is not consistent across SSA, with some countries—particularly in East Africa—having clear wealth profiles (with the richest having the highest HIV prevalence) and others—particularly in Southern Africa—having no clear relationship.\textsuperscript{4} Evidence further shows that HIV tends to be concentrated in richer regions within countries and in urban areas, which tend to be richer than rural areas.\textsuperscript{7}
The existence of a positive-wealth gradient in HIV infection in SSA—the paradox of wealth—is counterintuitive to the idea that rich people would be less likely to be infected because they are better educated, have a higher exposure to government messages and mass media, better access to condoms and generally be more incentivized to adopt safe-sex practices, given they have more to lose from infection.

In explaining the positive HIV-wealth gradient, a number of risk factors for HIV may increase with both wealth and education, including the number of multiple and non-marital sexual partners and the likelihood of premarital sex. The wealthy—even though more informed about transmission and having better nutritional status—can afford to maintain multiple concurrent relationships, buy sex from commercial sex-workers, access broader social and sexual networks, and generally be more mobile (they can move to geographic sites with higher background HIV prevalence). All of this increases their vulnerability to HIV. In settings with more mature epidemics, wealthy men through informal and/or commercial sexual relationships coupled with resistance to condoms, have helped channel HIV infection to the general population.

Mishra et al used Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data from eight African countries to examine the relationship between wealth and HIV infection; adults in the wealthiest quintiles had a higher rate of HIV infection than those in poorer quintiles. A Kenya study that used DHS data found a stronger wealth effect for women than men; wealthier
women were 2.6 times more likely than the poorest women to be HIV positive.\textsuperscript{18,37} Given the finding that women in higher socioeconomic strata were more likely to be HIV positive, some have concluded that access to funds may put women at heightened HIV because of increased sexual autonomy, access to more partners, or greater opportunities for travel.\textsuperscript{38}

Critique: The positive wealth gradient hypothesis has been critiqued due to methodology challenges: disentangling new incidence and wider prevalence may be challenging, especially as mortality rates are not fixed across the population due to unequal access to antiretroviral drugs.\textsuperscript{4} In a cross-sectional study, a positive correlation between economic status and HIV prevalence could reflect the fact that wealthy people with HIV live longer with the disease and are more likely to be present in the population to be tested for HIV.\textsuperscript{4,18} Nationally representative data may mask important variations within countries in particular differences between wealthier and poorer regions, and between urban and rural settings.\textsuperscript{19}

**Relative inequalities not absolute income**

Although absolute wealth has been associated with HIV infection—living in a wealthier region increased an individual’s odds of HIV infection and living in a poorer region was protective of HIV—within each region, HIV infection rates are higher among both relatively poor
individuals in wealthier areas and relatively wealthy individuals in poorer settings. Relative poverty (having more to do with income distribution or economic inequality) rather than absolute poverty is correlated with high rates of HIV infection. Income inequality, an indicator of social distance between individuals, can increase HIV risk by increasing transactional sex networking between the rich and poor, thus putting both the poor and the non-poor at greater risk for acquiring HIV. Socioeconomic inequality increases relative deprivation and can either push desperately poor women experiencing declining standards of living to engage in transactional sex to meet basic survival needs, or exert pressure on upwardly mobile women to seek out wealthy “sugar daddies” to raise their living standards by supplying them with “cars, cash, and cellphones.”

Countries with greater inequality have higher HIV prevalence, especially in SSA. The relationship between income inequality—adjusted for absolute wealth—and HIV infection risk was examined by Fox and colleagues using DHS data from 16 countries. Their main findings—that wealthier individuals in poorer countries/regions, and poorer individuals in wealthier countries/regions had a higher probability of being infected with HIV—highlighted the importance of regional wealth inequality as a significant predictor of individual risk for HIV infection. Existing qualitative studies suggest that wealth inequality may increase patterns of sexual concurrency (i.e., having two or more sexual partners overlapping in time), and create
opportunities for informal transactional sex between relatively wealthier men and relatively poor women.¹⁹

**Shifting epidemic and reversing wealth gradient**

Hargreaves et al (2008) reviewed the relationship between HIV infection and education and found that education was either risk neutral or a risk factor for HIV early in the epidemic, and became a protective factor with maturing of the HIV epidemic as the more educated responded to HIV information campaigns by adopting protective behaviors including condom use.⁹ In many countries, the spread of the AIDS epidemic has followed a definite pattern where, early in the epidemic, HIV/AIDS primarily affected the wealthy and better educated (who, due to their relative wealth, are part of a larger sexual network) but, as the epidemic matured has shifted and became concentrated in poor populations (who, because of their lower educational attainment and social position, are less empowered to change their sexual behavior).⁴,¹⁸,²³ The evidence of a non-linear relationship between wealth and HIV infection suggests that relatively poor individuals—neither the wealthiest nor the poorest were most at risk for HIV infection—and that the social gradients in HIV infection may be in the process of reversing as those of lower socioeconomic status experience higher rates of transmission, and HIV becomes concentrated among the relatively poor.¹⁸,¹⁹ A retrospective study that used DHS data, AIDS indicator surveys, and national sero-behavioral surveys of 12 African countries, concluded that it is the context in
which some people are wealthy and others poor that leads to
sexual networking patterns associated with the risk of HIV
infection—not the state of being poor or rich per se.4,35

**Gendered economy, income disparities and trans-actional sex**

The feminized nature of the HIV/AIDS has led many
scholars, in particular feminist scholars, to correlate the
epidemic to intertwined relationship between poverty and
gender in Africa.23,32 Gender norms have created economic
inequalities that limit women’s full participation in the
productive economy and increase their dependence on men,
thus generating asymmetrical sexual power structures that
weaken their bargaining position for HIV testing and/or
condom use to protect themselves and others from infect-
ion.7,18,23,28,35

An unpublished study in Kenya that used individual-level
data on HIV status and community level poverty and
inequality measures found gender inequality (defined as
income inequality between young women and adult men) to
be significantly correlated with an individual’s HIV-positive
status.18 However, other studies have found that women’s
HIV risk stems from engaging in concurrent sexual
relationships while their primary partners are away.7 One
study found that men and women in the same socioeconomic
status are equally likely to be infected, and that the positive
association between wealth and HIV is as steep for women as
it is for men, suggesting that wealthy men are not infecting poorer women as the “sugar daddy” literature would submit. Recent studies of sero-discordance couples—where one partner is HIV-positive and the other partner is HIV-negative—in high migration settings have found that the direction of spread of the epidemic is not only from returning migrant men to their rural partners, but also frequently from women to their migrant partners.

In a review and synthesis of the literature to characterize the nature and determinants of transactional sexual relationships in SSA, Stoebenau and colleagues identified three broad paradigms: sex for basic needs, sex for improved social status, and sex and material expressions of love.

The “sex for basic needs” paradigm depicts women as vulnerable victims whose limited opportunity sets—by virtue of their gendered economic and social marginalized position—are forced to trade sex for money, food, or other material support. Sex for basic needs occurs in the context of poverty, food insecurity, gendered labor markets, unequal access to economic capital, and in disadvantaged positions in certain industries (e.g., fishing and mining). Women who engage in sex for basic needs resort to transactional sex and multiple sexual partnerships because they are financially dependent on men or have been economically abandoned by their partners, work in low-skilled low-wage jobs, or have unstable or seasonal employment in the informal sector.
The “sex for improved social status” paradigm is characterized by women’s desire to acquire luxurious consumer goods beyond their purchasing ability—expensive jewelry, cellular phones, fashionable clothing, cash, and cars\cite{5,20,40}—associated with the middle-income status and lifestyle.\cite{6,41} Depicted as the “3-C’s boyfriend” phenomenon, studies in East and Southern African countries have found that, rather than being driven by deprivation or economic survival, women are increasingly motivated to enter sexual transactions by a greater desire to acquire commodities representative of modernity, and to attain symbols of upward social mobility. Evidence from the collaborative ethnographic *Love, Marriage, and HIV* project found that the pursuit of modern identities creates particular patterns of risk—riskier, informal concurrent sexual network structures—even in the context of marriage.\cite{7,42} Men in these contemporary relations may be motivated to demonstrate their sexual prowess and social status. These contemporary sexual exchanges for financial or lifestyle rewards are characterized by multiple sexual partnerships.\cite{5,7,20,40,41} In these relationships, women are not passive victims of male decisions, but make “conscious trade-offs between the risks and the benefits of informal exchange relationships.”\cite{4,21} While this 3-C phenomenon has been reported in young women living in urban areas, there is evidence to suggest that it exists in rural contexts, and is practiced by some young poor men.\cite{40} The “sex for improved social status” paradigm results from relative deprivation fueled by economic processes of globalization, exposing women to Western ideals, and creating increased demand for
and social value of consumer goods as new symbols of modernity and upward mobility.

The “sex and material expressions of love” paradigm depicts the entanglement of love and money, where gendered gift exchange occurs in the context of emotionally intimate relationships, characterized by men’s central role providing material and financial support as an expression of love. 6 Love complicates relationships, making it difficult for women to exit abusive relationships, or even negotiate condom use or HIV testing due to the fear of coming off as being judgmental and untrusting. Young women are at particularly heightened risk for transactional sex relationships compared to young men, due to their relative economic vulnerability and disenfranchisement. 34 Women that largely depend on men for economic support and status are “choice-disabled,” and engage in risky sexual behavior to secure men’s attention, fatalistically accepting the concomitant risk of HIV and sexual violence as a necessary part of survival. 43 In these situations, a woman’s freedom to leave a high-risk sexual relationship is limited, as is her ability to negotiate safer sex with a non-monogamous sexual partner. 23

**Conclusion**

In the fourth decade since the start of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, significant progress has been made in reducing both HIV incidence and AIDS-related mortality. HIV/AIDS is still a life sentence and leading cause of disease and mortality in
SSA. A substantial body of research suggests that simplistic correlations between socioeconomic status and HIV prevalence are, at best, misleading. HIV/AIDS cannot accurately be termed a “disease of poverty”—even though poor individuals and households are likely to be hit harder by the downstream effects of AIDS—nor can it be accurately characterized as a “disease of affluence”—given the evidence of the reversing social gradient of HIV in certain contexts. In this brief literature review, there is evidence to support the conclusion that the disproportionately high HIV rates in SSA compared to the rest of the world is largely due to a combination of concurrency, or overlapping sexual partnerships, transactional sex, and intergenerational sex, and not necessarily the high rates of sexual activity per se. To reduce HIV infection rates in SSA, HIV prevention programming and messaging must be responsive to shifting social norms and values in an increasingly consumeristic and interconnected global economy that has impacted gender interactions and created new patterns of sexual networking, shaping HIV infection risk.
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While extensive work and surveys have been done of Muslim American life and the demographics and dynamics of various Muslim communities in the United States (i.e. Haddad & Esposito 1998, Schmidt 2004), Muslims in relation to American law (Moore 2010), and not least on Muslim women, gender, and the issue of hijab (i.e. Haddad et al. 2006, Karim 2009), much less scholarly attention has been given to Muslim American youth. There are few in-depth studies and ethnographies on Muslim youth in the United States (for exceptions see Maira 2009, 2011, and Naber 2012) compared to the extensive research on Muslim youth in countries such as Britain and Canada. Hermansen (2003) has called for additional scholarship of alternative Muslim youth identities in the United States and how these identities intersect with race and class. Studies of the younger generation of Muslim Americans, many born in the United States, shed important light on the diversity of Muslim Americans, the future directions of Islam, competing readings and interpretations
of the faith, and also new emerging Muslim identities in a globalized world.

A critical ethnography which explores the diversity of identity formations on multiple connected scales can offer important contributions to the larger body of scholarly work on belonging, citizenship, and migration, from the intimate realm of emotional life to the social and public realm of political activism and mobilization.

During my year as a Global Studies fellow, I’m working on my book project *Young, Muslim, and American* focuses on Muslim youth cultures and identities in Milwaukee, a mid-sized, racially segregated city in the American Midwest. Through in-depth interviews, the study examines the diverse personal, social, and religious expressions of Muslim identities, along with multiscalar politics that are being articulated and manifested in the contemporary United States. This project focuses in particular on the intersections of gender, religion, and race in the context of everyday life, building on previous and ongoing projects of mine and further exploring my interest in identity formation. In my first book, *Becoming Muslim* (2006), I approached this subject in the context of conversion to Islam; more recently, my colleagues Caroline Seymour-Jorn, Kristin Sziarto, and I have worked with Muslim community leaders within the Muslim Milwaukee Project, a community-university collaboration. For this latest study, we conducted two demographic surveys of Milwaukee’s Muslim communities
(Sziarto, Mansson McGinty, and Seymour-Jorn 2013, 2014), and in another ethnographic project, Muslim Women’s Activism in the Midwest, I examined gender identities with respect to Muslim women’s visibility and community activism in Milwaukee (Mansson McGinty 2012, 2014). At a time when “Muslim” has become a politicized identity category, scholars need to examine what meanings Muslims themselves ascribe to the term. For my work, this entails questions such as: What does “Muslim” mean to young Muslims, and how do these meanings relate to gender, race, ethnicity, and citizenship? How are different Muslim identities expressed and lived in the everyday lives of Muslim youth? What role does Islam play in their personal and public lives?

There are epistemological concerns that influence my research and, since the category of “Muslim” is central to my work in general, I find it important to highlight a couple of points here. The exploration of Muslim youth identities reflects the ongoing negotiation and interpretation of what Islam means and what role it should play in public life in 21st century American society at different scales. This includes the intimate, personal realm as well as political representation and strategy in the public sphere. My project explores the various trending ideas about how Islam should be lived, from conservative to progressive interpretations, and what a Muslim identity means in American society. However, there is an unfortunate trend within the scholarship on Muslim lives that tends to overlook other belonging and identities such as age, locality, and sexuality among
Muslim informants (Hopkins 2009). Most scholarly work begins by recognizing the fact that Muslimness means many different things—that the category of “Muslim” is not a homogenous entity—but, as I have argued elsewhere, the scholarly production of “Muslim geographies” runs the risk of reifying this same identity category. Encouraged by a political motivation to challenge Islamophobia, many scholars rely on and thus inevitably perpetuate the category of “Muslim” (Mansson McGinty 2015).

I see two critical strategies to counter this trend in scholarly knowledge production: one, to give serious attention to the everyday lives and lived intersectionality of “Muslims,” namely what Muslimness means in relation to other identities and affiliations that may be equally important. And second, to highlight what Leonard calls the “invisible Muslims” (2003:43). For example, due to a political incentive to counteract anti-Muslim discourses, many scholars, including myself, have focused primarily on hijabis—Muslim women donning the hijab—to show that they are not oppressed, silenced, or lacking agency. This is all very important, but an unfortunate consequence is that Muslim women and men who are not visibly Muslim, as well as Muslims whose lives are more secular, do not get as much scholarly attention, producing unwarrantable silences and crude dichotomies in public representations and academic discourses on Islam and Muslim identities. Consequently, in my ongoing ethnographic work I wish to interview not only visibly practicing Muslims, but also young women and men
who may be identifying as Muslim without following certain religious practices and Islamic dress codes and may interpret the Islamic faith and the role of Islam in public life differently. As a side note, it should be added that the visibility of Muslim identity, as well as the associations of individuals to the Islamic faith, work not only through style of dress but is problematically intertwined with racialized ideas pertaining to skin color.

**Diverse Muslim Geographies: Alienation and Belonging in Everyday Life**

The overall book project involves fieldwork and in-depth interviews with self-identifying Muslim women and men (within the age group 18-25 years) in Milwaukee, including politically and religiously active, nonreligious, as well as “un-mosqued” and “invisible” Muslims. This implies doing fieldwork beyond the Muslim Student Associations and mosques, reaching out to youth who might not necessarily be religiously active or affiliate with a particular religious center. Further, recognizing the racially segregated nature of Milwaukee as a post-industrial city and the diverse face of Muslims, ethnically, nationally, politically and religiously speaking, I aim to engage in conversations with youth from various racial and ethnic backgrounds as well as different neighborhoods.

The project draws on feminist, geographical, and anthropological perspectives and is informed by a feminist
interest in the experiential, embodied, and emotional dimensions of everyday lives. Feminist geographers have made important contributions by arguing that geopolitical events and phenomena such as violence and war, national identity, and transnational migration are best understood not merely as large scale constructs but rather as intimate, embodied, and material practices (Staeheli, Kofman, and Peak 2004, Fluri 2009, Pain and Staeheli 2014). Feminist geographers Rachel Pain and Lynn Staeheli use the term “intimacy-geopolitics” (2014) to capture the ways the most intimate and personal connects in complicated ways to other scales, including the geopolitical. “Intimacy-geopolitics” suggests the inseparability of the two, but also “the intimate as foundational to and within other realms” (345). The young Muslim men’s and women’s histories and identities are linked to particular geopolitical events and phenomenon such as immigration, national identities, Islamic revivalism, and anti-Muslim discourses influencing domestic and foreign politics. I’m interested in understanding how these are lived and experienced in the youth’s everyday lives. I argue that is precisely in the context of the everyday that we can best understand the dynamic relationship between the intimate/emotional and geopolitical, the experiential and the discursive, the personal and the political, and how these are intimately interlinked.

My conversations with young Muslim women and men remind us that larger political constructs and ideas, whether it is citizenship or anti-Muslim representations, are ultimate-
ly lived and place-based, linked to emotionally laden experiences and memories (cf. Mansson McGinty 2015). The narratives reflect Muslim geographies of belonging and exclusion—what I understand as the parallel processes of belonging and alienation in everyday lives. These processes are clearly related to various differences, including gender and race, and I aim to investigate these intersections further when I have gathered a more robust ethnographic material.

No doubt, most of the interviewees talk about emotional and embodied experiences of Islamophobia. In my conversation with Akeem, he talked extensively about his memories of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. He was only nine at the time, but remembers in vivid details the grave look on his dad face, not going to school for a week, and his dad temporarily shortening his name to a more American sounding name. Further, the two most important spaces in his life, his home and school, were targets of Islamophobic hate crime. His family’s house was graffitied and egged and his school was under various kinds of threats for month to follow, receiving multiple bomb threats, had swastikas painted on it, as well as a pig carcass thrown outside it. Akeem described how the police presence at school became normal, contributing to an ever-present fear of assaults and racial discrimination which slowly became part of everyday life.

All of the women I have interviewed thus far wear the hijab, and their experiences of Islamophobia are predominately linked to the headscarf, a visible, bodily marker of their
Islamic faith. Islamophobia does not only work through encounters with strangers in public spaces, but as Mona attested to, even in the most intimate relationships. In our interview, Mona described the painful childhood experience of disapproval, rejection and estrangement when her grandmother during a vacation trip forced her to remove the hijab and wear short-sleeve shirts and shorts. She was twelve years old, and had a year earlier made the decision to don the headscarf. This is another example of how Islamophobia is embodied and experienced in everyday life; anti-Muslim sentiments and ideas are literally acted upon her body by her grandmother forcing her to unveil.

The youth’s narratives are not only about alienation and discrimination. Importantly, most of my conversations with them center around school, activism, hobbies and interests, family and friends, reflecting examples of everyday geographies of belonging and “making home” (Dwyer 2003). In the interviews they reflect at length on their aspirations and future dreams. At times it is their engagement and love for what they are studying that makes up a critical portion of their narratives. Mona, whose dad is Lebanese and mother a white American, is an art and education student and speaks extensively about the meaning of art in her life and its salient connection to her sense of self. For Mona, her Muslim identity and sense of belonging to Milwaukee are embodied and manifested partly through her experiences as a college students and her art projects. She works with colorful fabric and textile, and through religious imaginary she displays
reinterpretations of the hijab and modest dress. Similarly, Nadira, who was an architecture student at the time of our two interviews, spoke most passionately about her Muslim activism and her love for buildings and architecture, as well as her dream to start her own architecture firm. Nadira spoke about two neighborhoods of the city in which she feels at home, the south side and the east side. She lives on the south side close to the Islamic Society of Milwaukee (ISM), a neighborhood where many Muslims reside. On the UWM campus on the east side, Nadira has found a diverse community of students, all with an “architecture eye,” which is like a “second family” to her. She is passionate about her studies, and described the studio on campus, in which she feels comfortable doing her daily prayers, as a second home. It is in connection to her studies and campus life that she claimed that it is in Milwaukee that she belongs. Both Mona and Nadira are religious and wear the hijab, although the meanings of it varies between the two young women. They have both attended Salam School, the Islamic school at ISM, as well as private Catholic high school and public high school, respectively. They have experienced insults and discrimination, from strangers as well as family members, but reflecting the complexities of everyday geographies, these experiences exist parallel with the emotional and embodied sense of belonging and making Milwaukee their home. These are examples of the dimensions of the everyday that importantly constitute these young people’s experiences of who they are as “American Muslims” and their lives in the American Midwest.
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0. Introduction

In recent decades the idea of ‘public reason’ has become increasingly influential within a number of academic disciplines. I presently am completing a book on this idea, entitled *Public Reason: Consensus or Convergence*?1 In this article—through summaries of the book’s proposed chapters—I aim to provide a brief explanation of the idea of public reason, including its main variants and associated debates. My hope is that by the end of the article readers will have a sense of the current state of play within the public reason literature.

1. Overview of the idea of public reason and the main aims of the book

Citizens in contemporary liberal democratic societies endorse a plurality of religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines (such as Buddhism, Catholicism, utilitarianism, and so forth). This pluralism cannot be eliminated without the
exercise of politically oppressive power—something that liberalism’s principle of toleration rules out. Yet accommodating this pluralism seems to threaten the ideal of consensual democratic decision-making. This is because decisions regarding deeply contested political issues—for instance, what the laws should be concerning abortion, education, physician-assisted suicide, same-sex marriage, and so forth—seem to involve citizens imposing political positions drawn from their respective religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines upon one another.

In recent decades theories of ‘public reason’ have been developed to explain how citizens within pluralist societies can make mutually acceptable political decisions. The idea of public reason thus purports to harmonize the principle of liberal toleration with the ideal of democratic self-government. But despite the importance of the idea of public reason within contemporary philosophy, political science, law, education, gender studies, theology, and other disciplines, there presently is no book that focuses on introducing this idea and the main debates concerning it. This book aims to fill this lacuna.

Specifically, the book will present the two most influential contemporary accounts of public reason. The first is the ‘consensus’ account of John Rawls,² according to which public reasons are reasons that reasonable citizens agree should apply to their common political and economic institutions. The second is the ‘convergence’ account of Gerald Gaus,³
according to which the reasons that citizens use to decide political questions need not be shared so long as those reasons converge in support of common political decisions. The main criticisms of both accounts of public reason also will be discussed.

Furthermore, the book will advance contemporary discussions of public reason by introducing some new analyses and arguments drawn from my recent and current research. First, it will address the (generally neglected) relation between public reason and ‘ideal theory,’ and provide a novel account of that relation. Second, it will explore the educational implications of the idea of public reason, including the ways in which students (as future citizens) might be taught how to engage in public reasoning when deciding fundamental political questions. Third, it will outline a new account of consensus public reason, what I call the ‘civic people’ account, which overcomes the weaknesses of alternative accounts. Hence the book will be of interest both to readers looking for a critical introduction to the idea of public reason and its main debates, as well as to established scholars working within the field.

2. Chapter Summaries

Chapter 1: The idea of the social contract and contractualist political justification

In this chapter I provide some historical background for
understanding the idea of public reason. I begin by noting certain common elements of the classical social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. Despite the many differences between these theories, they all are concerned with justifying political authority to the citizens subject to it, that is, they all advance ‘contractualist’ accounts of political legitimacy (in contrast to earlier accounts of legitimacy that appealed to religious authority). Part of this process of justification involves determining what kinds of political regimes are normatively legitimate. This process of justification draws upon versions of the idea of a ‘state of nature,’ a pre-political condition of humanity, and appeals to conceptions of persons as (in some sense) free, equal, and rational.

Chapter 2: Rawls’s resurrection of political contractualism

I explain in this chapter how Rawls resurrected philosophical interest in contractualism with the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971. Among the key elements of Rawls’s theory that I discuss are: (1) the idea of the ‘original position’ (an updated version of the classical social contract idea of the state of nature); (2) the conception of justice, ‘justice as fairness,’ that Rawls proposed would be selected by rational, free, and equal parties within the original position; and (3) the kind of ‘well-ordered society’ that Rawls thought would be stable over time by means of the free allegiance of its citizens to that society’s conception of justice.
Eventually Rawls came to have doubts about the account of stability in *Theory*. This is because part of that account rested upon the acceptance by all citizens of a broadly Kantian ideal of autonomy. Rawls came to think that not all citizens within a well-ordered society would endorse this ideal. Instead, citizens, through the free exercise of their reason, invariably would come to endorse a plurality of ‘comprehensive doctrines’ (religious, moral, and philosophical views). This ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ motivated Rawls to develop his theory of ‘political liberalism,’ of which the idea of public reason is a central component. ‘Public reasons’ are reasons that reasonable citizens agree should govern their common political life, despite their adherence to different comprehensive doctrines. I conclude the chapter by explaining how the idea of public reason is a form of contractualist justification meant to apply to societies characterized by reasonable pluralism.

*Chapter 3: Rawls’s consensus account of public reason*

In this chapter I present the main elements of Rawls’s idea of public reason, as developed in *Political Liberalism* and “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” Rawls holds that decisions concerning fundamental political questions—those having to do with ‘constitutional essentials’ and ‘matters of basic justice’—should be made by means of shareable public reasons (reasons that all reasonable citizens find acceptable). Such reasons include the idea that a democratic society’s ‘basic structure’ (its main political and economic insti-
tutions) ought to be a fair system of social cooperation amongst free and equal citizens. (Because Rawls’s account requires that public reasons be shareable, it often is referred to as a ‘consensus’ account.)

Rawls proposes that the idea of public reason should be understood as “part of the idea of democracy itself.”¹⁰ This is because by deciding fundamental political questions via shareable public reasons, or by ensuring that their political representatives do so, citizens can relate to one another as equal co-sovereigns. Citizens also are the subjects of political decisions. Political power is ultimately coercive in nature, but the exercise of such power over citizens can be normatively legitimate—it can satisfy what Rawls calls the ‘liberal principle of legitimacy’—if it is authorized by a constitutional structure that is justified in terms that citizens all find acceptable.

Public reasons are directed at a moderately idealized justificatory constituency: citizens whom Rawls labels ‘reasonable persons.’ Reasonable persons acknowledge the fact of reasonable pluralism and are committed to what Rawls calls the ‘criterion of reciprocity.’ According to this criterion, roughly, political decisions regarding constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice must be acceptable to those citizens subject to them (even if those decisions are not the most preferred ones of all citizens). Satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, then, involves citizens providing mutually acceptable justifications for their shared exercise of
political power.

I then discuss the content of Rawlsian public reason. Among public reasons are ecumenical democratic ideals and civic virtues, like transparency and toleration, as well as general rules of inquiry, such as those concerning evidence, logic, and so forth. Furthermore, public reasons can be drawn from what Rawls terms ‘reasonable political conceptions of justice.’ Conceptions of justice are ‘reasonable’ if they satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. Such conceptions secure a set of specially ranked ‘basic liberties’ equally for all citizens (including liberty of conscience, freedom of association, and the political liberties of democratic citizenship), as well as adequate resources (including education and wealth) for all citizens to exercise effectively those liberties over the course of their lives. A reasonable conception of justice is ‘political’ if it is compatible with the various comprehensive doctrines endorsed by reasonable citizens, that is, if it is ‘freestanding’ in nature. A political conception of justice also is limited in its scope to the basic structure of society, and hence does not apply to all domains of social life. (‘Comprehensive’ conceptions of justice, in contrast, presuppose the truth of particular comprehensive doctrines, such as utilitarianism, and/or apply directly to domains of social life beyond the basic structure.) Rawls holds that there is a ‘family’ of reasonable political conceptions of justice, but that the conception of justice as fairness is the ‘most reasonable’ one.

Another core element of Rawls’s idea of public reason that I
explain in this chapter is the ‘duty of civility.’ This is a moral (not legal) duty that citizens, and especially public officials (legislators, judges, and the like), have to decide fundamental political questions by means of public reasons. The duty of civility applies primarily to what Rawls terms the ‘public political forum’: those institutions where fundamental political questions are debated and authoritative decisions with respect to them are made (such as national legislatures and constitutional courts). Citizens who are not public officials fulfill their duty of civility by holding public officials to the idea of public reason when evaluating their performance within the public political forum, especially when voting. The duty of civility does not apply to what Rawls calls the ‘background culture’ of society (the various associations and media of civil society).

Chapter 4: Public reason and ideal theory

In this chapter I address the relation between ‘ideal theory’ and public reason. The relation between these two ideas in Rawls’s political philosophy often is overlooked or ignored in discussions of either idea by philosophers and political theorists. I explain that this is a mistake.

Rawls’s idea of a ‘well-ordered society’ is part of what he calls ideal theory, as it assumes (inter alia) that citizens ‘strictly comply’ with the requirements of justice. The idea of a well-ordered society is meant to help guide non-ideal theory. It does so by enabling citizens to evaluate critically their
existing political institutions, determine which injustices to address first, and provide them with a long-term target for their political reforms. I explain how Rawls’s account of the relation between public reason and ideal theory evolved, and why he ultimately concluded that the duty of civility applies to both ideal and non-ideal theory.

I then formulate a novel argument concerning the relation between public reasoning and ideal theorizing. If one is committed to public reasoning when deciding fundamental political questions, I explain, then one also must be committed to (at least some form of) the ‘strict compliance’ feature of ideal theory in justifying political decisions. This is because the idea of public reason is based upon the criterion of reciprocity: public reasons inherently aim at securing the acceptance, and consequently the compliance, of the reasonable persons to whom those reasons are addressed. I suggest that theorists who endorse (some version of) public reason justifications but reject ideal theory—such as Elizabeth Anderson, Gerald Gaus, and Amartya Sen—fail to appreciate this consequence of public reason’s basis on the criterion of reciprocity.

Chapter 5: Two debates amongst consensus public reason theorists

Here I discuss two debates amongst theorists who endorse versions of Rawlsian public reason.
The first debate concerns the scope of public reason. As noted earlier, Rawls holds that the duty of civility requires that questions regarding constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice be decided by shareable public reasons. The duty of civility, however, does not apply to (what may be termed) ‘ordinary’ legislative questions. Rawls suggests that while it may be desirable to try to decide such questions by means of public reasons, this is not always possible, and is not required by the liberal principle of legitimacy. Against Rawls, Jonathan Quong contends that the duty of civility should apply to all political questions. 13 This is because, broadly speaking, the exercise of political authority concerning any matter should be justifiable to all of those subject to that authority. After presenting Quong’s arguments, I consider some reasons for preferring Rawls’s more modest position. One reason, roughly, is that citizens can assure one another publicly of their compliance with the duty of civility if it applies only to a limited range of fundamental political subjects: constitutional essentials (citizens’ democratic rights and liberties) and matters of basic justice (issues concerning fair equality of opportunity with respect to education and employment, and the overall distribution of income and wealth). This is because citizens know that all such questions can be decided via public reasons, as political conceptions of justice are ‘complete’ regarding them, whereas this is not the case with respect to other kinds of political questions.

The second debate concerns rival justifications for the idea of
public reason. Some authors claim that public reason justifications for the exercise of political power are required in order to satisfy a principle of ‘respect for persons’ or ‘civic respect’ (variants of this claim are advanced by James Boettcher, Charles Larmore, Martha Nussbaum, and myself\textsuperscript{14}). Other defenders of Rawlsian public reason contend that by relying upon shareable public reasons, citizens can realize an ideal of justice, specifically, a conception of society as a fair system of social cooperation amongst free and equal citizens (versions of this view are defended by Samuel Freeman, Jonathan Quong, and Paul Weithman\textsuperscript{15}). And some philosophers propose that when citizens employ public reasons when deciding fundamental political questions, they promote or maintain a form of political community or ‘civic friendship’ with one another (this view is defended by Kyla Ebels-Duggan and Andrew Lister\textsuperscript{16}). I note that while versions of all these justifications for the idea of public reason can be found in Rawls’s writings, he is not especially clear on how they relate to each other, and which one (if any) is most basic. In addition to commenting on the strengths and weaknesses of each of these justifications, I explain what is at stake in this debate, that is, why it matters for certain political questions which justification of public reasoning is taken to be basic. For instance, respect-based justifications focus on coercively enforced laws, whereas community-based justifications also have to do with non-coercive exercises of political authority.\textsuperscript{17}

*Chapter 6: Four challenges to consensus public reason*
I discuss in this chapter four lines of criticism that have been advanced against Rawls’s idea of public reason over the past two decades.

The first criticism holds that the duty of civility imposes unfair burdens upon citizens of faith. This is because such citizens often find it necessary to draw upon their religious views in order to decide certain fundamental political questions (for instance, whether abortion or physician-assisted suicide should be legally permitted), and find it difficult or even impossible to offer shareable public reasons for their positions. According to this criticism, then, requiring deeply religious citizens to satisfy the duty of civility imposes special burdens upon them in political deliberation. Moreover, to the extent that religious citizens try to fulfill the duty of civility, their ‘integrity’ may be threatened. One reason why this may be so is that the reasons that such citizens take to be the most important ones applicable to certain issues may conflict with the available public reasons concerning those issues. (Authors who advance versions of this line of criticism include Christopher Eberle, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Kevin Vallier.18) I then discuss some replies to this line of criticism (including those from Christie Hartley and Lori Watson).19

A related objection has to do with public reasoning and claims concerning the ‘truth,’ or more precisely, ‘normative truth’ (that is, claims regarding what is morally or politically
true; claims concerning the ‘truth’ of empirical matters, as understood in everyday discourse and the established sciences, are allowed within public reasoning). In order to be compatible with reasonable citizens’ various comprehensive doctrines, Rawls proposes that political conceptions of justice, and hence public reasons that draw upon those conceptions, rely upon the notion of the ‘reasonable’ instead of that of the ‘true.’ An objection to this view, the most influential statement of which is from Joseph Raz, is that Rawlsian political liberalism cannot explain why citizens should give priority to public reasons over those normative commitments that they regard as true in cases where they conflict—at least not without asserting the truth of some more fundamental principle (such as, say, the importance of social stability in pluralist societies). I present the main replies to this line of argument, including Joshua Cohen’s argument that, contra Rawls, shareable public reasons can claim to be ‘true.’

The third objection that I discuss in this chapter is known as the ‘asymmetry objection.’ This objection focuses on what can count as public reasons. According to Rawls, such reasons can be drawn from reasonable political conceptions of justice, but not from citizens’ various comprehensive doctrines, including those doctrines’ ‘conceptions of the good.’ One reason for this asymmetry, according to Rawls, is that there are no conceptions of the good, or elements of disparate conceptions of the good, that are shared by all reasonable persons within contemporary pluralist societies.
A number of critics (such as Bruce Bower, Simon Caney, and Jeremy Waldron22) object to Rawls’s asymmetry with respect to the sources of public reasons. This line of criticism, the asymmetry objection, holds that citizens also disagree over conceptions of justice. Given pluralism with respect to justice, then, permitting controversial claims regarding justice to count as public reasons while excluding controversial claims regarding the good23 looks unjustifiably arbitrary. I then consider the reply advanced by Jonathan Quong,24 according to which reasonable citizens do share a set of underlying normative commitments that ‘contain’ their various disagreements over matters of justice, but that this is not the case with respect to citizens’ comprehensive doctrines and conceptions of the good. I also consider an alternative reply that dissolves the asymmetry objection. According to this reply, roughly, public reasons concerning the good should be permitted by the consensus account, so long as those reasons are shareable by reasonable citizens.

A final criticism that I discuss in this chapter, advanced most notably by Susan M. Okin in her writings on political liberalism,25 is that Rawlsian public reasons—because of their limited scope and ‘neutrality’ with respect to many religious views—are incapable of securing adequately the freedom and equality of women. I present some replies to Okin’s arguments (including from Amy Baehr, and myself26) that contend that laws and policies that promote gender equality can and should be justified via public reasons. I also consider the recent argument (versions of which have been
advanced by Christie Hartley and Lori Watson, and Gina Schouten²⁷) that Rawlsian political liberalism, including its idea of public reason, must be a feminist form of liberalism because of its underlying commitment to the criterion of reciprocity. I conclude the chapter by discussing some current work by contemporary feminist political liberals.

Chapter 7: The convergence account of public justification

In this chapter I outline the main elements of Gerald Gaus’s ‘convergence’ account of public justification.²⁸ I begin by explaining why Gaus rejects Rawls’s version of public reason. First, Gaus contends that Rawls’s requirement that public reasons be shareable by all reasonable citizens is too demanding, as it cannot accommodate the pluralistic forms of reasoning that citizens should be permitted to employ when deciding political questions. Second, Rawls’s account of public reasoning relies upon what Gaus takes to be an excessively ‘idealized’ conception of citizens (according to Rawls’s conception, citizens are [adequately] ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’ persons; Gaus interprets this conception to be inappropriate for or inapplicable to many actual citizens). I suggest that Gaus’s criticisms are misplaced. With respect to the first, the fact that shareable public reasons must be used to decide only constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice—and that such decisions are made within the ‘public political forum’ (the national legislature, constitutional court, and the like)—means that the duty of civility is not especially demanding for most citizens. With respect to
Gaus’s second criticism, I propose that his own characterization of the citizens to whom public justifications are owed—the justificatory constituency that Gaus terms the ‘members of the public’—is not substantially less demanding than Rawls’s rational and reasonable citizenry.

I then explain that part of Gaus’s theory is an ambitious account of ‘social morality.’ This is the system of social rules with which people within a diverse society reasonably can demand compliance by everyone. For the purposes of my discussion, though, I focus on the application of Gaus’s account of public justification to the political domain, that is, the justification of state-enforced laws. With respect to legislation, Gaus contends that what he calls the ‘Public Justification Principle’ (PJP) applies. This principle states: “L is a justified coercive law only if each and every member of the public P has conclusive reason(s) R to accept L as binding on all.” Hence Gaus holds that a political decision can be legitimate if all reasonable citizens—the members of the public—have (at least) a sufficient reason to support it. Different members of the public, however, can rely upon different, even incompatible, reasons to support laws. For instance, some citizens might use reasons drawn from their respective religious doctrines while others might appeal to philosophical views like utilitarianism. For this reason, Gaus’s account of public justification often is referred to as a ‘convergence’ account: diverse justifications can ‘converge’ in supporting a law, and thereby secure the legitimacy of that law, even if there is no ‘consensus’ amongst all members of
the public on any of those justifications.

I conclude the chapter by discussing Gaus’s claim that convergence public justification ‘tilts’ toward some form of ‘classical liberalism.’ This marks an important difference with Rawls, who holds that his egalitarian conception of justice as fairness is the most reasonable one that can be justified by (shareable) public reasons. In contrast to Rawls’s liberal egalitarianism, Gaus holds if each law within society must satisfy the PJP, a classical liberal regime—one with strong private property protections, minimally regulated markets, few (if any) social welfare programs, and only limited provision of public goods—most likely (but not inevitably) will emerge over time. In response to this claim, I present Andrew Lister’s argument that Gaus fails to appreciate how inter-dependent many laws are with respect to their justifications for many members of the public; that is, that citizens often evaluate important laws in a ‘holistic’ manner. Moreover, drawing upon analyses by G.A. Cohen and Jeremy Waldron on the relation between property and coercion, I explain that Gaus underestimates the amount of coercion that must be exercised by the state in order to maintain classical liberal institutions, including especially extensive private property rights (at least according to the views regarding coercion of some members of the public). The upshot of my analysis is that justificatory liberalism has no inherent classical liberal tilt.

*Chapter 8: Four criticisms of the convergence account of*
public justification

In this chapter I discuss four criticisms of the convergence account of public justification that have been advanced in recent years by theorists who favour (some version of) the Rawlsian consensus account.

The first line of criticism, advanced most notably by Jonathan Quong, is that Gaus’s account presupposes a philosophical theory of ‘reasons’ that not all reasonable citizens can endorse. More specifically, Gaus presupposes a ‘person-relative’ account of reasons, according to which it is possible for x to be a reason for person A, given her system of beliefs and values (say, Buddhism), but not for person B, given his system of beliefs and values (say, Catholicism), but nonetheless for B correctly to regard x as a genuine reason for A. This is a controversial claim about the nature of reasons—a claim not presupposed by the consensus Rawlsian view—one that arguably undermines the inclusiveness of Gaus’s account.

A related criticism, also advanced by Quong, holds that the PJP permits citizens to violate public reason’s ‘sincerity requirement’ (a requirement defended by Rawls and, more recently, Micah Swartzman). According to this requirement, roughly, citizens have a duty to support only those political principles and proposals that they sincerely believe to be publicly justifiable. According to the convergence account, though, person B, in recommending that A endorse
a law, may advance reason $x$ insincerely—it is ‘insincere’ because $B$ himself does not believe that $x$ is a real reason, but thinks that $A$ may believe it to be a reason, given $A$’s overall system of beliefs and values. This criticism (like the previous one) does not apply to the consensus account, as that account requires that public reasons be shareable reasons.

A third criticism that I discuss concerns the role of public reason justifications with respect to citizens’ relations and social stability. According to Paul Weithman, as well as Gillian Hadfield and Stephen Macedo, when citizens use shareable public reasons to decide fundamental political questions, they assure others of their ongoing commitment to the political principles and values that those reasons draw upon. Such mutual assurance can help maintain citizens’ commitment to act justly in their relations with one another, despite their adherence to different comprehensive doctrines. In contrast, the disparate non-public reasons that the members of the public can draw upon according to Gaus’s convergence account of justification cannot play this public assurance role with respect to stability and justice.

A fourth criticism is that the PJP is not a robustly democratic principle of legitimacy. Recall that, according to Rawls, the idea of public reason should be understood as part of the idea of democracy itself. Defenders of the PJP, including Gaus and Kevin Vallier, oppose Rawls’s conception of public reasoning as a form of ‘deliberative democracy’ (relatedly, they also oppose the priority that Rawls gives to securing the
‘fair value’ of the political liberties for all citizens). Indeed, in contrast to the Rawlsian duty of civility, Vallier holds that the PJP imposes no duties on citizens whatsoever; instead, the PJP is to be satisfied through institutional mechanisms and the deliberations of public officials (legislators and judges). Against the PJP, some critics (for instance, Lori Watson, Paul Weithman, and myself) contend that it misses one of the main motivations for Rawlsian consensus public reason: namely, the ideals of political autonomy and deliberative democracy. Instead of construing citizens as ‘co-sovereigns,’ so to speak, the PJP construes citizens primarily as ‘subjects.’

Chapter 9: Public reason and citizenship education

In this chapter I explore some of the educational implications of consensus public reason and (more briefly) convergence public justification.

I begin by discussing a debate amongst some consensus public reason theorists concerning the requirements of ‘citizenship education,’ that is, the kind of education that all students within a pluralist society need in order to become free and equal citizens as adults. Rawls claims that public reasons can justify only a limited set of educational requirements for all students within a pluralist society. Stephen Macedo and Victoria Costa, however, maintain that Rawlsian political liberalism requires a form of citizenship education that is far more demanding than that proposed by Rawls himself. Gordon Davis and I, in
contrast, defend Rawls’ s position. These different views have implications for the content of mandatory citizenship education and the latitude for educational choice (in the form of, for instance, publicly-funded ‘vouchers’ that can be used at private religious schools). I propose that the differences between Macedo and Costa, on the one hand, and Davis and myself, on the other, might be attributable, at least in part, to their different foci. Macedo, and Costa focus on non-ideal theory, specifically the contemporary American context, whereas Davis and I begin, as does Rawls, within ideal theory, and consider various non-ideal circumstances from that perspective.43

In the second part of the chapter I discuss some pedagogic strategies for promoting the duty of civility within future citizens.44 I outline some exercises and lessons—such as practice debates over important constitutional questions (both contemporary and historical)—that can teach students how to use shareable public reasons when deliberating about fundamental political matters. These exercises and lessons, I explain, cultivate within students a capacity for a ‘political’ form of what Philip Pettit calls ‘republican liberty,’ that is, freedom as ‘non-domination.’45 An education in public reasoning, then, also is an education for political non-domination.

I conclude the chapter by considering the educational implications of convergence public justification, especially the account advanced recently by Vallier.46 The convergence
public justification account entails fewer requirements for citizenship education—and hence affords much greater scope for parental choice with respect to the education of children—than any version of consensus public reason. I suggest that this implication reveals a noteworthy defect with the convergence public justification account: it fails to secure adequately the freedom and equality of children qua future citizens.

Chapter 10: The ‘civic people’ account of public reason

Drawing upon some of the points made in the previous chapters, I outline the version of the idea of public reason—what I call the ‘civic people’ account—that I think is the correct one. This new account of consensus public reason, I propose, overcomes the main problems with the alternative views discussed earlier in the book.

I begin by formulating a principle of equal ‘civic respect’ for persons. Civic respect is a form of mutual ‘recognition respect’ that should govern free and equal citizens’ shared exercise of political power within pluralist societies. The principle of equal civic respect can underpin political liberalism’s idea of public reason.

I then show how a broadly ‘Rousseauian’ account of democratic self-government can be realized within contemporary pluralist societies based upon the principle of equal civic respect. I begin by modifying Michael Bratman’s theory of
shared agency so that it can apply to large-scale groups, including political societies. Drawing upon this modified account of shared agency, I explain that citizens within a pluralist society, on the basis of civic respect, can constitute a kind of corporate moral agent, a ‘civic people,’ by committing themselves to a ‘shared policy’ to decide fundamental political questions on the basis of shareable public reasons. In a civic people, the exercise of coercive political power satisfies the liberal principle of legitimacy, as the justifications for that exercise conform to this shared policy. Consequently, such political power is, as Rawls puts it, “the power of free and equal citizens as a collective body.”

In the final part of the chapter, I explain that the civic people account of democratic self-government can help us make progress with respect to three current debates concerning the scope, role, and nature of public reasoning. First, I propose that the civic people account supports Rawls’s claim that only questions concerning constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice must be decided via public reasons. Second, while limited in its scope, the shared policy that constitutes a civic people requires that only shareable public reasons play a justificatory role in deciding fundamental political questions. Third, I explain that the kind of shared policy that constitutes a civic people is not possible if we adopt the convergence account of public justification. Consequently, I propose that insofar as citizens are committed to realizing an ideal of equal political autonomy, they should reject the convergence account of public justification.
and endorse the civic people account.

Chapter 11: Conclusion

I conclude the book by providing a recap of the main points made in the previous chapters.

Appendix: Additional debates

In this appendix I briefly mention some additional debates concerning public reason that I did not discuss in the book because of space limitations. I provide references to relevant articles, chapters, and books to assist readers interested in exploring further those debates.

3. Final comment

My hope is that, by the end of the book, readers will appreciate why both the consensus and convergence versions of what may be termed ‘public reason liberalism’ are attractive and plausible responses to the religious, moral, and philosophical diversity characteristic of contemporary democratic societies. I also hope to have provided some reasons for readers to endorse the Rawlsian consensus account of public reason, and specifically the civic people version that I formulate in the penultimate chapter of the book, over the convergence alternative.
Notes

5. In the original position, very roughly, principles of justice for a society’s ‘basic structure’ (its main political and economic institutions) are selected by parties who represent the citizens of that society behind what Rawls calls ‘the veil of ignorance.’ This veil deprives the parties of particular knowledge concerning the citizens whom they represent (knowledge of those citizens’ gender, ethnicity, economic class, natural talents, religious views, and the like). This ‘ignorance’ is meant to ensure the fairness of the principles selected—since the parties do not know whom they represent, the principles selected must be acceptable to all citizens irrespective of their particular identities or social locations. The parties in the original position, however, do possess general knowledge (concerning the laws of nature, how societies function, and so forth), and are rational. Clearly, then, the original position is a kind of hypothetical contract, a ‘philosophical device,’ and does not refer to any actual (past, present, or future) choice situation. One role of the original position is to help clarify and discipline our thinking about political justice in diverse societies.
6. The conception of justice as fairness consists of two principles. The first principle specifies a set of ‘basic liberties’ that are to be secured equally for all citizens within the
constitutional structure of society (these liberties include freedom of thought, liberty of conscience, freedom of association, the ‘political liberties’ [such as the right to vote and run for office], freedom of political speech, and the like). The second principle requires that any economic inequality in society must (a) benefit the ‘least advantaged’ citizens over time more than any other system of economic distribution, and (b) not undermine or violate the fair equality of opportunity of all citizens to compete for positions of authority and responsibility. The first principle of justice enjoys ‘lexical priority’ over the second (that is, the basic liberties cannot be violated or weakened for the sake of promoting the second principle). Justice as fairness, then, is both a ‘liberal’ conception of justice (because of the basic liberties that it secures in its first principle) and an ‘egalitarian’ one (because of second principle’s commitment to the fair equality of opportunity of all citizens and to maximally improving the condition of the least advantaged).

7. I discuss the idea of a well-ordered society further in chapter 4.
8. Rawls 2005 (original edition published 1993). (Further references will be to the expanded 2005 edition.)
9. Rawls 1997 (republished in Rawls 2005). (Further references will be to the Rawls 2005 version.)
11. Here I draw upon Neufeld 2017a.
2011.
17. These differences are discussed helpfully in Bird 2014.
23. For instance, ‘perfectionist’ claims about what has most value in life.
29. Gaus 2010, p. 244.
30. See especially Gaus 2010.
32. More precisely, when evaluating a particular political proposal, citizens’ evaluation of that proposal—their decision to endorse or oppose it—may depend on what other laws, rights, policies, and institutions exist within their society. So, for instance, citizens’ evaluation of a proposal to introduce an unconditional basic income likely will depend on what other forms of social insurance exist in their society (and whether the proposal in question will supplement or replace them), their society’s overall level of economic wellbeing, its system of property rights and distributive policies, and so
forth.
34. Quong 2011.
35. Quong 2011.
42. Davis and Neufeld 2007.
43. This analysis draws upon Neufeld 2013.
44. Here I draw upon Neufeld 2013, and Neufeld and Davis 2010.
47. I draw upon and update the conception formulated in Neufeld 2005.
48. I take the idea of ‘recognition respect’ from Darwall 2006. Simplifying somewhat, recognition respect—unlike what Darwall calls ‘appraisal respect’—is the form of respect owed equally to all persons who possess certain features (such as a capacity for adequate rationality and reasonableness) or who enjoy a certain status (such as that of citizen). (Appraisal respect, in contrast, can vary in proportion to the skills, virtues, or other features of persons.)
50. Rawls 2001, p.40
References


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The Center for International Education at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee selected five Global Studies Fellows for the 2016/17 academic year. The Global Studies Fellows program, established in 2010, aids faculty in advancing their research on interdisciplinary topics relating to globalization, its cultural, political, social, economic, and environmental dimensions. Global Studies Fellows meet monthly to share their progress and devise research strategies. They also share their work at a series of colloquia, and participate in CIE’s annual conference.
Jennifer Kibicho is Assistant Professor in the College of Nursing at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. She is a Health Economist with expertise in the economics of prescription drug cost drivers and Medicaid policies, and a Certified Public Accountant of Kenya (CPA(K)). She has received funding as the Principal Investigator of a National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) R21 Project, and served as an economic consultant on several research and program evaluation projects. She has several publications in top health policy journals including AIDS and Behavior, and Health Affairs. Her global health research is focused on the intersection of economic vulnerability and structural-level factors including alcohol misuse and gender-based violence as key drivers of HIV transmission and acquisition risk in sub-Saharan Africa.
Anna Mansson McGinty is Associate Professor of Geography and Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Her research centers on the formation of Muslim identities and geographies in the West, examining identity processes, gender and religion, and politics of representations. She is the author of Becoming Muslim: Western Women’s Conversions to Islam (2006), and in one of her current projects, Young, Muslim, and American: An Ethnography of Muslim Youth in Milwaukee, she looks at the diverse religious, political, and personal expressions of Muslim youth cultures and identities in the 21st century United States. Her work has been published in journals such as Environment and Planning A, Gender, Place and Culture, Social and Cultural Geography, and The Professional Geographer.
Blain Neufeld is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. He also serves as Director of the interdisciplinary certificate in Ethics, Values, and Society (CEVS). His research focuses on various issues related to the account of justice and legitimacy known as "political liberalism." He has written articles and chapters on a variety of topics in political philosophy, including citizenship education, liberal feminism, political liberty, public reason, and international justice. His primary project for 2017 is to complete a book under contract with Routledge tentatively titled *Public Reason: Consensus or Convergence?*
Tasha Oren is Associate Professor of English and Media Studies and teaches in the Media, Cinema, and Digital Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. She is the author of *Demon in the Box: Jews, Arabs, Politics and Culture* (2004), co-editor of *Global Formats: Understanding Television Across Borders* (2012), *Global Currents: Media and Technology Now* (2004), *East Main Street: Asian American Popular Culture* (2005) and *Global Asian American Cultures* (2016). She has published numerous articles on film, television, screenwriting, Neurodiversity, and food media, and is currently at work on a book manuscript on food culture and television as well as the forthcoming collection *The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Feminism*. 
Chia Youyee Vang is Associate Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee where she is founder and director of the Hmong Diaspora Studies Program. She is an interdisciplinary historian who has given voice to marginalized groups through her studies on displaced peoples. Her research focuses on American involvement in Southeast Asia in the post-WWII era and the large flow of refugees in the aftermath of the American war in Vietnam and her teaching interests include 20th century U.S.-Asia relations, Cold War politics, Hmong/Asian American history, refugee migration, and transnational and diaspora studies. She is author of *Hmong America: Reconstructing Community in Diaspora* (2010) and *Hmong in Minnesota* (2008). Her co-edited book, *Claiming Place: On the Agency of Hmong Women*, was published in 2016 and her monograph, *Fly Until You Die: An Oral History of Hmong Pilots in the Vietnam War* is forthcoming from Oxford University Press in 2017.
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